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INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION FROM THE POINT  




This paper is on Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and 
its exercise through democratic participation. First, I will expound on 
why the right to self-determination—as configured in international 
law, translated by many states and adopted by Indigenous 
communities—enhances liberal democratic governance. Then I 
will provide a cursory glance at the many and varied ways in which 
Western and non-Western liberal democracies have made efforts 
to accommodate Indigenous peoples in their public institutions. 
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The normative principle of the right to self-determination has been 
adopted as the legal right underpinning Indigenous polities’ human 
rights worldwide. Within the framework of liberal democratic 
governance, the right to self-determination is the gold standard 
for virtually all countries with Indigenous populations—except 
for Australia. 
Unlike most United Nations Member States including Canada, the 
United States, New Zealand and Nordic countries, the right to self-
determination has been eviscerated from the lexicon of Australian 
politics.1 It has been coarsely defined as a ‘failed experiment’ and 
even more erroneously described as antithetical to Aboriginal 
economic development.2 This is news to the many successful liberal 
democracies around the world that succeed in delivering far better 
outcomes in health and wellbeing, employment and education 
than we do in Australia. Economic development is inextricably 
linked to self-determination. Self-determination is about freedom. 
Australian policy makers have abandoned self-determination as a 
framework to underpin Indigenous policy. However, the right to 
self-determination and human rights remains fundamental to the 
aspirations of Aboriginal communities. This disconnect is significant 
and scaffolds the ongoing disparity in health, employment, 
education and other outcomes in Australia. 
Human rights and the right to self-determination have been critical 
to the advancement of Indigenous rights in Australia because the 
state has been deficient in resolving the fact of dispossession and 
that Aboriginal people never ceded the land. Given Australia’s 
history of delivering “bucket loads” of unfreedom to Aboriginal 
communities, it would be ahistorical to pillory the allegiance of 
the Aboriginal political domain to human rights and in particular 
the right to self-determination.3 
The General Assembly’s adoption of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples expounded not only on the 
right to self-determination and participation in decision-making 
processes affecting them, but also the right to ‘control the outcome 
of such processes.’4 The Declaration contains more than 20 general 
provisions pertaining to Indigenous peoples and decision-making. 
This is because ‘[t]he right to full and effective participation 
in external decision-making is of fundamental importance to 
Indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of other human rights.’5
Since its creation, the United Nations system has served as the 
supra-national institution to which subjugated and marginalised 
people turn when their own countries fail to accommodate their 
distinct cultural interests.  The cross pollination of ideas between 
the 700 million Indigenous peoples of the world means we are 
aware of what works and does not work from the experiences of 
others. For that, contemporary Australian policy is an example of 
what not to do. 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
In international law the putative right to democratic governance 
tells us that liberal democracies are distinguished by free, fair 
and periodic multi-party elections. This right to democratic 
governance is underpinned by the United Nations Charter and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Contemporary liberal democracies are procedural democracies. 
That is to say, citizens’ participation is more or less limited to a 
procedural right (the right to vote) and less scrutiny is paid to 
the quality of decision-making between elections. In this regard, 
Australia is not unique. There is voluminous literature on how 
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to improve the quality of decision-making between the ballot 
boxes. Indeed this explains advocacy for a bill of rights or a federal 
corruption commission.
There are other opportunities for citizen participation outside 
the ballot box such as submissions to parliamentary inquiries, 
protests, letters to editors, lobbying politicians or a robust 
inquisitive media—but there are limitations to each of these. 
Certainly OECD testing of civics shows Australian students are 
close to the bottom of the table in terms of understanding basic 
tenets of democracy, unlike USA students who occupy the top, 
for example.
Procedural democracies like ours calibrate politics to become 
attuned to what political scientists call ‘majoritarianism’: a current 
of utilitarianism. This means that the eye is trained to the middle. It 
also means that small numbered groups or even large numbered 
groups distinguished by no power and no money fall outside the 
spectrum of what parliament—whose eyes are always attuned 
to the next election—is interested in.
Most liberal democracies temper majoritarianism in a variety 
of ways. These may include electoral systems that encourage 
more independent or minority voices, entrenching ‘rights’ in 
bills of rights or charters of rights or, in the case of Indigenous 
peoples, incorporating treaties, agreements or other constructive 
arrangements, reserved seats or Indigenous parliaments. Australia 
has resisted such structural accommodation of Indigenous 
peoples.
Section 116A6 and the parliamentary body proposed by the Cape 
York Institute7 are identified by Indigenous peoples as two ways in 
which a parliament attuned primarily to majoritarian democracy 
may be constrained. They are substantive and carefully considered 
proposals for law reform. 
Australia’s democratic culture, distinguished by an extreme form 
of parliamentary sovereignty, poses a problem for Indigenous 
peoples who constitute approximately two per cent of 22 million 
people. We are saying that the ballot box is not enough for us. 
We cannot influence the ballot box. So much of the trajectory 
of Indigenous advocacy over the decades, both before and after 
1967, has been aimed at that.
We see this step on a long trajectory from first contact, to the 
conciliation phase, to the killing times or frontier wars, to the 
protection era, to assimilation, to self-determination and to the 
current phase of policy-making labelled by Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott as ‘neo-paternalism’.
Underpinning this advocacy is the idea that communities know 
their own communities better than outsiders. And providing 
human beings with the freedom to participate in decision-
making about their own lives, including the freedom to think 
and imagine and dream about their own version of the good 
life, is a good thing. 
This is why there are internal decision-making processes within 
Indigenous communities. But these are virtually non-existent 
externally. Mechanisms enabling the participation of Indigenous 
peoples in external, non-Indigenous decision-making processes 
(such as parliament) allow for greater Indigenous influence over 
decisions in practice.
WHAT IS GOOD PRACTICE ON THE RIGHT TO  
SELF-DETERMINATION IN DEMOCRATIC  
PARTICIPATION INTERNATIONALLY?
The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a 
mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council, has 
conducted a study on this very topic: 
Indigenous peoples are among the most excluded, marginalized 
and disadvantaged sectors of society ... Decision-making rights and 
participation by indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them 
is necessary to enable them to protect, inter alia, their cultures, 
including their languages and their lands, territories and resources.8
The Expert Mechanism tells us that the most significant indicator 
of good practice is likely to be the extent to which Indigenous 
peoples were involved in designing the practice and their 
agreement to it. This is critical to Indigenous peoples given that:
Many remain vulnerable to top-down State interventions that take 
little or no account of their rights violations and circumstances. In 
many instances this is an underlying cause for land dispossession, 
conflict, human rights violations, displacement and the loss of 
sustainable livelihoods.9
One example adopted by the Expert Mechanism is education. 
The r ight of Indigenous peoples to identify their own 
educational priorities and to participate effectively in the 
formulation, implementation and evaluation of education plans, 
programmes and services is crucial for their enjoyment of the 
right to education. Truth and reconciliation commissions offer 
Economic development is 
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determination. Self-determination   
is about freedom.
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a model for improved relations between states and Indigenous 
peoples as well.
International law and jurisprudence recognise that the ‘duty 
to consult indigenous peoples applies whenever a measure 
or decision specifically affecting indigenous peoples is being 
considered (for example, affecting their lands or livelihood)’.10 This 
duty also applies in situations where the state considers decisions or 
measures that potentially affect the wider society but which affect 
Indigenous peoples, particularly in instances where decisions may 
have a disproportionately significant effect on Indigenous peoples.
How have different states dealt with this? In many varied ways. The 
following is an extract from the report of the Expert Mechanism 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
PANAMA
The Kuna Yala Comarca is one of five special territorial units in 
Panama with administrative autonomy through general, traditional, 
regional and local councils. The Comarca is governed by Kuna 
traditions and customs and makes its own decisions within 
the framework stipulated by the Constitution and legislation. 
Indigenous peoples make the majority of decisions on cultural, 
economic and political matters affecting their populations and 
monitor Indigenous rights.11
SÁMI
The Sámi Parliaments are representative advisory bodies that 
were established in Norway, Sweden and Finland in 1989, 1992 
and 1995 respectively. Among other objectives, they facilitate 
consultation with the Sámi people on matters affecting them. 
The mandate and regulation of the parliaments differ from one 
country to the other.
SWEDEN
In Sweden, the Sámi Parliament has been granted special 
responsibilities relating to participation in decision-making. For 
example, it decides on the distribution of state grants, Sámi schools 
and manages Sámi language projects. It is the administrative 
agency responsible for reindeer husbandry, participates in social 
planning and monitors compliance with Sámi needs, including the 
interests of the reindeer industry with regard to land and water. It 
also disseminates information on Sámi conditions.12
FINLAND
In Finland, under section 9 of the Sámi Parliament Act 1995, the 
authorities are required to negotiate with the Sámi Parliament on 
all important measures that may directly affect the status of the 
Sámi as an Indigenous people.13
NORWAY
The Government of Norway and the Sámi Parliament agreement 
on Procedures for Consultations recognises that the Sámi have 
the right to be consulted on matters that may affect them directly, 
and sets out procedures applicable to the government and its 
ministries, directorates and other subordinate state agencies or 
activities in matters that may affect Sámi interests directly. This 
includes legislation, regulation, specific or individual administrative 
decisions, guidelines, measures and decisions.14
NEW CALEDONIA
In New Caledonia, Congress is legally required to consult with 
the Customary Senate, consisting of Kanak Senators from each of 
the New Caledonian customary areas, when considering any law 
or policy affecting Kanak identity. When the Customary Senate 
disagrees with the law or policy, Congress must reconsider its 
decision, after which the position of Congress applies.
While this practice preserves the supremacy of the New Caledonian 
Congress on matters that are of fundamental importance to the 
Kanak, it provides the opportunity for Kanak representatives to 
contribute to congressional deliberations.15
INUIT - REGIONAL INITIATIVES 
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference is a good example of regional 
cooperation between Indigenous peoples. The Conference holds 
quadrennial general assemblies at which issues such as resource 
development and climate change are discussed. The associated 
Inuit Leaders’ Summit brings together Inuit leaders of the regional 
and national governments of Inuit nations.
NEW ZEALAND 
In New Zealand, the Maori have had guaranteed representation in 
parliament since 1867. Anyone of Maori descent can choose to be 
on either the Maori electoral roll or the general electoral roll. Since 
1996, the number of Maori seats in the House of Representatives 
(‘the House’) varies according to the proportion of Maori registered 
on the Maori electoral roll compared to the general electoral roll.16 
Currently, there are seven Maori seats in the House. The House also 
has a Maori Affairs Select Committee, to which the House may refer 
any issue with implications for the Maori.
BURUNDI
Similarly, in Burundi, the Batwa have permanent seats in the 
National Assembly in both houses and there has been guaranteed 
Batwa representation on the National Land Commission.17
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
In the Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Region of the Russian 
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Federation, an Assembly of Indigenous Peoples is part of the 
structure of the regional Duma (parliament). The region has a 
legislated quota of Indigenous representation. Another positive 
solution at the provincial level is the additional guarantee of 
Nenetz direct representation in the relevant autonomous okrug 
(district).18
NEPAL
Proportional representation electoral systems can assist in the 
election of Indigenous individuals to State parliaments, as seen 
under, for example, the Interim Constitution of Nepal.19 However, 
measures may also be needed to ensure that the election of 
Indigenous individuals translates into influence in decision-making.
SOUTH AFRICA
In South Africa, the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act 2003 provides that any parliamentary bill pertaining 
to the customary law or customs of traditional communities must, 
before it is introduced and passed by the House of Parliament, be 
referred by the Secretary of Parliament to the National House of 
Traditional Leaders for its comments.20
COLOMBIA
In Colombia, the Constitution reserves parliamentary seats for 
Indigenous peoples, chosen directly by Indigenous communities. 
Two (out of 102) seats in the upper Senate are elected by 
Indigenous communities and one (out of 166) is elected for the 
lower Chamber of Representatives.21
CONCLUSION
I have first expounded on why accommodating the right to self-
determination enhances liberal democratic governance. Second 
I have provided a very cursory survey of the ways in which liberal 
democracies grapple with Indigenous populations, based on 
the report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  
The examples provided by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples show us that many liberal democracies are 
grappling with the same questions as Australia. Each of the states 
referred to are working to better accommodate Indigenous voices 
into democratic decision-making and to improve the quality of 
decisions being made about the lives of Indigenous peoples.  
Amala Groom 
Between the lines #1 Mein Kampf vs Idi Amin, 2014
Acrylic on canvas  
1240mm x 950mm 
Image by Shayne Johnson
1 4   I   I N D I G E N O U S  L A W  B U L L E T I N  J u l y  /  A u g u s t ,  V o l u m e  8 ,  I s s u e  1 9  
With the recognition project now formally in its fifth year—since 
the work of the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples began—section 116A 
and an Indigenous parliamentary body are identified by Indigenous 
peoples as two approaches to disciplining the majoritarian 
tendency of the parliament. These proposals for reform could also 
improve the quality of decision-making on matters pertaining to 
Indigenous peoples lives.
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S E E K I N G  PA R T N E R S H I P S
The Indigenous Law Centre is currently seeking 
partnerships from organisations, community 
groups and interested individuals to help fund our 
community legal education and research programs. 
Those interested can partner with us to fund an 
edition of the Indigenous Law Bulletin (ILB) and/or 
its partner publication the Australian Indigenous 
Law Review (AILR). 
This year organisations who have sponsored 
editions of the ILB have so far included the National 
Children’s and Youth Law Centre and UNSW Law.
If you or your workplace would like to sponsor an 
edition of the ILB or AILR please email: 
ilc@unsw.edu.au or call 02 9385 2252.
Collaborations and larger partnership agreements 
are also welcomed. Interested parties can contact: 
Jordana Wong, UNSW Law
jordana.wong@unsw.edu.au.
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